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During the almost twenty years since the transition to democracy South Africa has 
adopted and implemented market-friendly economic policies; yet the gap between 
rich and poor is growing,1 there is uneven access to the (middle class) labour 
market2 and unemployment rates remain high. During the Mbeki presidency the 
policy debate on the South African economy was characterised as a dual economy, a 
“first” and “second” economy, and the Government explained the apparent paradox 
– of market-friendly policies associated with high levels of unemployment and 
poverty – through the existence of “first” and “second” economies.  
In November 2003, in an address to the National Council of Provinces then 
President Mbeki stated: 
“The second economy (or the marginalised economy) is characterised by 
underdevelopment, contributes little to GDP, contains a big percentage of our 
population, incorporates the poorest of our rural and urban poor, is structurally 
disconnected from both the first and the global economy and is incapable of self 
generated growth and development.”3 
The notion of dualism in South Africa came to dominate the policy debate.  The 
extent of this can be gauged by the fact that most government departments adopted 
some policy addressed at the “second economy”. The Presidency co-ordinated a 
large research project aimed at developing some coherent policies aimed at the 
                                               
* We are grateful to Lekani Lebani who provided research assistance. A lot of our ideas about the 
informal economy have been developed through collaborative work with Caroline Skinner. 
1 Leibbrandt et al “Trends in South African income distribution and poverty” (2010). 
2 Statistics South Africa “Profiling South African middle-class households” (2009). 
3 Available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000830/P944-SARPN_Second_Economy_ 
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“second economy” which has culminated in an impressive strategic framework.4 
However, in the process of formulating this framework, stakeholders have 
questioned the idea that the first and second economies are disconnected:  
“The differences in conditions between the two are so stark they appear to be 
worlds apart – giving the notion of ‘two economies’ resonance. Yet these realities are 
in fact connected and interdependent in a range of complex ways, with certain 
common processes producing or reinforcing these extremes in access and 
opportunity.”5  
Similarly, in earlier work, and in work jointly with Caroline Skinner, we have also 
criticised the conceptualisation of the South African economy as structurally 
separated.6 Instead, we argued that the economy is actually integrated and that, in 
part, the “two economies” idea allows government to justify its economic policies for 
the so-called first economy, even though little benefit accrues to most of the poor. 
We are also not convinced by the lumping of both informal workers and the 
unemployed into the “second” economy. While both are vulnerable groups, the sets 
of policy interventions required to address the problems of each are likely to be 
somewhat different. For this reason we fall back on the multiple categorisation of 
formal, informal and the unemployed.      
The purpose of this article is to find evidence of linkages between the formal and 
informal economies. In previous work we have focussed on the labour market, 
examining movements between the formal and informal economy. In this article, we 
develop this material further by exploring formal-informal linkages inside the 
household and we look at possible implications were we able to extend the analysis 
using other frameworks.  
The article is presented in five sections. The context for the research is presented 
in the introduction. The persistence of dual models to define and measure the South 
African economy (and labour market) is documented in part two along with 
definitions of the informal economy. Findings are presented in part three, including 
the sectoral character of employment churning within the labour market, 
associations within the household, and evidence of growing informality in the work 
sphere. Our analysis confirms earlier concerns about conceptualising the economy 
in a dualist fashion. We draw out, in part four, the implications of our analysis for 
poverty research and development of policy in South Africa and conclude the article 
in part five.   
 
2. PERSISTENCE OF DUAL MODELS TO DESCRIBE THE ECONOMY AND 
THE LABOUR MARKET 
Historiography of the South African economy demonstrates that arguments about 
dualism and the relationship between the mainstream of the economy and the 
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periphery have persisted over time in spite of a changing political context. This is 
most prominently captured in the debates of the early 1970s about the relationship 
between apartheid and capitalism in South Africa, with liberals arguing that 
capitalism would ultimately undermine apartheid as more and more of the African 
periphery came to be incorporated into the mainstream of the economy,7 and 
Marxists arguing that there was in fact a close, but exploitative, relationship 
between the mainstream and the periphery.8 In the mid-1980s the state continued 
to distinguish between a “modern” sector and the informal economy.9 This dualism 
persists through the notion of first and second economies.  
The persistence of a dualist view of the economy is significant not only because it 
was being articulated by the then President and is at odds with the way in which the 
ANC has traditionally viewed South African society, but also because it seems to 
inform much of the policy focus of the ANC. This conceptualisation of the economy 
has strong resonance with the dual labour market theories which emerged in the 
early 1970s. Thus, today’s first economy shares characteristics of the primary or 
core economy of the 1970s – stable, preferential employment conditions found with 
large-scale, capital intensive and advanced production process, an elaborate 
division of labour and hierarchy within the firm, and skilled and highly motivated 
well-paid workers with promotion prospects.10 Similarly, today’s second economy 
shares characteristics of the secondary (or peripheral) economy of the 1970s – 
insecure employment in small-scale, backward firms with limited prospects for 
workers. 
An alternative to the dual economy conceptualisation is to view the economy as a 
single entity. We agree the notion of a “second” economy is not helpful as an 
analytical category but there is also a danger in grouping the formal and informal in 
one economy. Chen, Vanek and Carr11 have called for greater recognition of informal 
work, noting that the quantity and quality of work generated are key determinants 
of the poverty and equity outcomes of different patterns of economic growth. In his 
book Work Svendsen12 focuses on work in the western context, stating that “to cover 
the working conditions of people in the developing world would be an altogether 
different essay”. In a survey intended to measure the contribution agriculture makes 
to GDP in South Africa, Statistics South Africa samples “registered” farms only. 
 These examples give support to Chen et al’s concern that, while formal work gets 
significant attention, informal and difficult-to-categorise employment is often either 
undervalued or omitted from conceptualisation and measurement of the value of 
employment. To redress this tendency we justify the use of “formal” and “informal” 
as analytical categories to (1) establish the significance of the informal economy, (2) 
provide a framework to include less obvious types of work, and (3) expose the 
                                               
7 Lipton Capitalism and Apartheid (1985) and O’Dowd, “The Stages of Economic Growth” (1978) 
8 Legassick “South Africa: Capital accumulation and  violence” (1974) and Wolpe “Capitalism and 
cheap labour power in South Africa (1972) 
9 Booth “Measuring the ‘success’ of employment creation strategies in the apartheid state” (1988) 
10 Fine Labour Market Theory (1998) 
11 Chen, et al Mainstreaming informal Employment and Gender (2004) 
12 Svendsen Work (2008) at 3. 




precarious nature of informal work, all with the ultimate objective of improving job 
conditions of informal and (increasingly informal) formal workers. Thus, while we 
say the economy is integrated, it is not seen as a homogenous entity and there is 
space for a formal-informal categorisation.  
Our analysis is to a large degree restricted by another binary categorisation, that 
of the “formal” and “informal” enterprise. Until recently, employment in the informal 
sector was based on the characteristics of the enterprise in which the person is 
employed. The definition of “informal economy” proposed at the 15th International 
Conference for Labour Statistics (ICLS) recommended the informal sector be 
defined in terms of one or more of the following criteria: (a) non-registration of the 
enterprise in terms of national legislation such as taxation or other commercial 
legislation; (b) non-registration of employees of the enterprise in terms of labour 
legislation; and (c) small size of the enterprise in terms of the numbers of people 
employed. Statistics South Africa has used this enterprise-based definition in order 
to derive estimates of informal employment in South Africa.  
More recently, the International Labour Organisation (ILO)13 and the 17th ICLS 
proposed an alternative definition for the informal economy, based on the 
employment characteristics of the worker. According to this definition the informal 
economy comprises informal employment (without secure contracts, worker 
benefits or social protection) of two kinds. The first is informal employment in 
informal enterprises (small unregistered or unincorporated enterprises) including 
employers, employees, own-account operators and unpaid family workers in 
informal enterprises. The second is informal employment outside informal 
enterprises (by formal enterprises, by households or with no fixed employer), 
including domestic workers, casual or day labourers, temporary or part-time 
workers, industrial outworkers (including home-based workers) and unregistered 
or undeclared workers. This gradation is important given Altman’s observation that 
employment in South Africa is shifting to “low wages, and fewer contractual 
obligations or benefits”.14 In spite of this broader definition, our analysis below is 
based on the enterprise definition since this has generally been used to measure the 
informal economy.   
 
3. LINKAGES BETWEEN THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL ECONOMY 
Since its “discovery” in the early 1970s,15 the informal economy has become an 
important area of research. Contrary to the initial conceptualisation of the informal 
sector as a transitory “backward” sector which would, in line with the Lewis model, 
disappear with development and growth, the informal sector has become a growing 
phenomenon in developing countries. Unlike South Africa, most developing 
countries do not directly collect statistics on informal employment. Based largely on 
the work of French statistician, Jacques Charmes, however, we are able to form 
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14 Altman “The State of employment and unemployment” (2003). 
15 Hart “Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana” (1973). 




estimates of informal employment in the developing world for the 1990s. As is 
evident from Table 1 below, in all regions of the developing world informal 
employment represented nearly half of total non-agricultural employment, ranging 
from 72% in sub-Saharan Africa to 48% in North Africa. The norm internationally is 
not to include agricultural employment in these estimates. Since we know that, 
especially in the least developed countries, agriculture forms a large part of the 
economy, including this sector these is likely to increase the estimates of informal 
employment and also likely to increase the women’s roles in the informal economy. 
Table 1: Informal Employment in non-agricultural employment, by sex 
1994/2000 
Region  Informal 













North Africa 48 43 49 
Sub-Saharan Africa 72 84 63 
Latin America 51 58 48 
Asia 65 65 65 
Source: ILO (2002) at 19. 
Notwithstanding this growth in informal employment and its dominance in much of 
the developing world, the informal economy has often been viewed as a sphere of 
the economy that is distinct from the formal sector. There have, of course, been a 
number of insightful contributions16 highlighting the linkages between the formal 
and informal spheres of the economy. In the policy arena, however, it is often the 
case that these are seen as separate and unrelated aspects of the economy. Guha-
Khasnobis et al17 highlight the fact that the formal and informal divide is still very 
much dominant. They argue that “we need to move beyond formality and 
informality to make progress in understanding the realities of economic activities in 
poor countries, and to design policies to benefit the poor.”  
There are two strands in the literature on the informal sector that do consider the 
issue of the relationship between the formal and informal. First, there is that 
concerned with defining the informal sector, which often defines it in relation to 
formal enterprises. The informal sector is easier to enter, has smaller enterprises 
using different and more indigenous technologies and is less skilled and regulated 
than the formal sector. Second, and related to this, the literature has been concerned 
with the structural relationship of the informal economy in relation to the rest of the 
economy. In the 1970s Marxists were concerned with whether the informal 
                                               
16 See, for example, Tokman V “An exploration into the nature of informal-formal sector 
relationships” (1978). 
17 Guha-Khasnobis et al Linking the Formal and Informal Economy (2006). 




economy constituted a reserve army of labour or “petty commodity production”. 
More recently, with the growing interest in micro-entrepreneurship especially 
among neo-liberal economists, the emphasis has been on issues of regulation in the 
formal sector and the growth of budding entrepreneurs in the informal economy, 
supposedly free of the regulatory burden that exists in the formal sector.18 We are 
beginning to see the emergence of a literature exploring these issues of linkages in 
South Africa. 
 
3.1 Intra-sectoral relationship between formal and informal economies 
Evidence suggests informal activity is more prolific in some industrial sectors than 
in others. The presence of a high proportion of informal activity is likely to suggest 
some form of linkage with the formal equivalent. Drawing on data from Statistics 
South Africa’s national accounts section, Budlender et al19 provide estimates of 
value added in the informal economy and the total economy (Table 2). These 
estimates confirm the relative importance of the informal economy in trade, 
construction and community services. The contribution of the informal sector 
within agriculture is unfortunately unknown as it is included in subsistence 
agriculture figures provided by the national Department of Agriculture. 
Table 2: Contribution of informal economy to value added, 1999 (R million) 
Industry Informal Total Informal as % of total 
Mining 89 44 186 0.2 
Manufacturing 4 782 135 952 3.5 
Construction 3 893 21 263 18.3 
Trade 25 019 95 159 26.3 
Transport 3 311 71 340 4.6 
Business services 8 967 141 928 6.3 
Community services 3 801 21 119 18.0 
Source: Budlender et al (2001). 
Using an input-output model supplemented by surveys, Naidoo et al20 develop 
estimates of formal and informal output for the economy. Their estimates show that 
informal production accounts for a substantial proportion of total production in 
selected sectors, notably trade, finance and construction (see Table 3 below).  
 
 
                                               
18 See Maloney “Informality revisited” (2004) 
19 Budlender, et al “The Informal Economy” (2001) 
20 Naidoo, et al “Linkages between formal and informal sectors in South Africa” (2004) 


















Agriculture 30 503 27 626 2 878 9.4 5.7 
Mining 51 358 51 277 81 0.2 0.2 
Manufacturing 236 782 230 380 6 402 2.7 12.7 
Electricity, 
Gas, Water 
26 551 26 551 0 0.0 0.0 
Construction 35 597 27 839 7 758 21.8 15.4 
Trade 100 056 83 460 16 596 16.6 33.0 
Transport 46 695 43 659 3 037 6.5 6.0 
Finance 71 045 60 605 10 440 14.7 20.7 
Other 32 844 29 689 3 155 9.6 6.3 
Total 631 431 581 084 50 347 8.0 100.0 
Source: Naidoo et al (2004) 
Skinner21 reports on a comprehensive survey of informal enterprises in the greater 
Durban area, where some 507 detailed surveys with informal workers were 
conducted. Her study provides some useful indicators of forward and backward 
linkages in the informal economy. Figure 1 below shows sourcing of raw material 
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Figure 1: Source of supply, n=503 (source: Skinner, 2005). 
                                               
21 Skinner “Constraints to growth and employment in Durban” (2005). 




The most frequently cited source of supply is medium to large (formal) enterprises, 
with six in every ten enterprise owners identifying this as a source. This suggests 
quite strong forward linkages into the formal economy. The second most cited 
source was a small enterprise or trader, with over five in every ten respondents 
identifying this as a source. A portion of these are also likely to be in the formal 
economy. It is interesting to note the role of foreign-linked supply networks in the 
informal economy. One in twenty respondents stated they sourced their goods from 
a foreigner.         
As is to be expected, there are sectoral differences in these linkages. Table 4 
below shows that certain informal activities are more strongly linked into the 
formal economy than others. Trade sectors (apparel, spaza shops and shebeens) 
tended to source their goods in medium and large shops. Just over half of those in 
the construction sector sourced supplies from medium and large shops. The 
responses from those working in traditional medicine indicated that a number of 
formal shops and foreigners were involved in supply. There are also more formal 
shops involved in supply of crafts than would be expected in a segment of the 
economy that is often considered to be entirely informal. With regard to apparel, a 
group of those interviewed are likely to be dressmakers as their supplies were 
provided by their customers.    

















Apparel  61 70 40 4 1 2 4 
Craft  43 73 1 9 13 5 5 
Traditional 
medicine 19 54 0 18 69 15 25 
Spaza shops 79 48 0 0 0 2 2 
Construction  56 41 51 0 5 0 3 
Metal work  79 37 30 2 0 0 5 
Shebeens 85 46 0 0 0 2 0 
Crèches 67 36 15 3 5 13 15 
Hairdressing 66 51 22 5 0 0 7 
N 292 274 82 28 70 25 40 
Source: Skinner (2005) 
The overwhelming majority of respondents – 495 or 98.4 % of those interviewed – 
sold their goods and services to private individuals or households. The forward 
linkages to other informal enterprises as well as the formal economy are thus not 




strong. Only 26 respondents (5.2%) said they sold to other informal enterprises. 
Just 15 enterprise owners (3%) reported that they sold to formal enterprises and 11 
(2.2%) said they sold to “middlemen” or agents. There also seems to be very little 
exporting, with only three respondents saying they sold to foreign businesses. There 
may be an undercount on this in certain sectors.  
Case study evidence indicates that there are multiple forward and backward 
linkages between formal and informal activities.  For example, Ince’s work on 
informal clothing manufacturing in a residential area in Durban demonstrated not 
only that manufacturers source their inputs in the formal economy, but that 
garments often end up in formal retail stores.22  Also Witt’s work on informal fruit 
and vegetable distribution demonstrates multiple linkages. 23   
Valodia et al24 examine economic and competitive relationships between the 
formal and informal economy. They explore whether pricing and related economic 
behaviour is shaped by considerations in the formal economy. Based on surveys 
conducted in informal markets in the Durban area, they find some evidence that 
informal street vendors are well-informed of prices in the formal economy and that 
their price-setting behaviour is shaped to some extent by the formal economy. 
Informal vendors competed with the formal retailers by offering similar products 
for sale, but in smaller packages and along convenient transport nodes in the city. In 
other words, there appears to be relatively higher levels of interaction in decision-
making between formal and informal retailers. 
 
3.2 Churning between formal and informal labour markets 
The panel component of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) allows us to explore 
dynamics in the labour market. The sampling design of the LFS, which is conducted 
bi-annually in March (previously February) and September allows for 80% of the 
sampling in each wave to remain in the sample. Thus, households remain in the 
sample over a consecutive number of surveys.   
We explore the labour market dynamics in these households beginning in 
February 2002 for five waves of the LFS ending in March 2004. Matching the 
individuals in these households over the period, we are able to get some indication 
of the extent to which workers move between employment and unemployment, and 
when employed between different segments of the economy, such as formal and 
informal.25  In total we were able to match 5 587 individuals over the period. Table 
gives a broad overview of how the status of these workers changed over the period.  
                                               
22 Ince “Nature of informal clothing manufacturing in a residential area” (2003) 
23 Witt “Fresh produce distribution networks in the Durban metropolitan area” (2003) 
24 Valodia, et al “Exploring economic behavior in South Africa’s informal economy” (2007) 
25 Note that the panel component of the LFS allows us to track households not individuals over the 
five waves of the survey. We have examined the sex and age profiles of workers in these households 
to confirm that the individuals remain in the panel. We have thus removed from the panel all 
households where the individuals inside the household may have changed (through, for example, 
migration). 




The data shows that there is a surprising level of churning within the labour market, 
with the status of more than half of the workers having changed at least once over 
the period February 2002 to March 2004.  As is to be expected, for those workers 
whose status remained unchanged, most tended to be employed in the formal 
sector, or remained economically inactive.  Only 1.3% of the 5587 workers that 
remained in the panel continued to work in the informal economy over the period 
under consideration. 
Table 5: Labour market status, February 2002 to March 2004, n=5 587 
Type of Worker Frequency Percent 
Remained in the formal economy 1,175 21.0 
Remained economic inactive 1,077 19.3 
Remained in commercial 
agriculture 
99 1.8 
Remained a domestic worker 89 1.6 
Remained unemployed 74 1.3 
Remained an informal worker 71 1.3 
Worker status changed 3,002 53.7 
 5,587 100.0 
(Source: Authors’ calculations from various LFSs) 
In Table 6 below we remove from the panel all workers who did not engage in 
informal economy activities over the period; i.e., we retain only workers who have 
been engaged in informal economy activities for at least one period. This reduces 
the number of workers from 5 587 to 1 009. Again we see a surprising level of 
churning occurring, with only 7% of workers remaining as informal workers over 
the entire period. 
Table 6: Labour market status of informal economy workers, February 2002 
to March 2004, n=1 009 
Type of Worker Frequency Percent 
Informal for 5 periods 71 7.0 
Informal for 4 periods 88 8.7 
Informal for 3 periods 106 10.5 
Informal for 2 periods 202 20.0 
Informal for 1 period 542 53.7 
 1,009 100.0 
(Source: Authors’ calculations from various LFSs) 




Table 7 shows the movement of workers that were employed in the informal 
economy in any one period over the panel. As is to be expected, a large number of 
workers moved between the informal economy and being unemployed or 
economically inactive. A significant proportion of workers (18.3%) moved between 
formal and informal employment. 
Table 7: Shifts between informal work and other Labour Market Status 
Type of Change Frequency Percent 
Informal and unemployed and not 
economically active 
191 18.9 
Informal and not economically 
active 
190 18.8 
Informal and formal 185 18.3 
Informal, formal and unemployed 77 7.6 
Informal, formal and not 
economically active 
73 7.2 
Remained in informal 71 7.0 
Informal and unemployed 60 5.9 
Informal, formal, unemployed and 
not economically active 
44 4.4 
Other 118 11.7 
 1,009 100.0 
(Source: Authors’ calculations from various LFSs) 
If we reduce the period under consideration to the six months between September 
2003 and March 2004, we still find fairly high levels of churning in the labour 
market.  Of those individuals recorded as informal workers in September 2003, in 
March 2004 44.5% reported working in the informal economy, 17.3% reported 
working in the formal economy, 11.4% reported being unemployed and 23.7% 
reported being not economically active.  Of individuals recorded as formal workers 
in September 2003, in March 2004 3.4% reported working in the informal economy. 
We are able to exploit income data in the LFS to explore some of the income 
dynamics related to movements between the formal and informal sectors. In 
particular, we explore below the shifts of the 185 movements between formal and 
informal reported in Table 7 above. Given that we are dealing with a 5-period panel 
there are a large number of formal and informal movements that are possible. In 
order to keep the analysis manageable, we focus only on some movements.  
Table 8 below summarises the movements that we will explore. The first, FFFFI, 
which occurs 39 times in the panel, shows workers that reported being in formal 
jobs over the LFSs for February 2002 to September 2003 (i.e., 4 surveys) and then 
shifted to an informal job in the last period of the panel (March 2004). Similarly, the 




second, FFFIF, which occurs 14 times, shows workers in formal jobs over the initial 
3 surveys, moving into an informal job in the fourth period (September 2003) but 
then moving back into a formal job in March 2004.  
Table 8: Movements between formal and informal jobs, 2001-2004 







(Source: Authors’ calculations from various LFSs) 
Using the LFS income bands26 and excluding non-responses, we observed very little 
change in FFFFI workers incomes over the fourth and fifth periods of the panel, 
when the worker shifts from formal to informal employment. Similarly, for IFFFF 
workers there was very little change in incomes over the first and second periods 
when the worker moves from informal to a formal employment. Using the median of 
income categories, we calculated that workers moving from formal to informal lose 
R236 on average while workers moving from informal to formal gain R424 on 
average. Although not reported in the article, shifts in incomes are relatively minor 
for the other combinations of formal and informal work over the five periods under 
consideration.  
Both in terms of the formal and informal classification, and in terms of the 
incomes reported, the data suggests two important characteristics of formal-
informal linkages. First, at the low end of the labour market, in what we have called 
low-waged work, the South African data suggests high levels of churning between 
formal and informal employment over a relatively short period of time. This 
suggests that low-waged workers are unlikely to benefit significantly from shifting 
from informal to formal employment, and vice-versa. Second, unlike the case in 
Latin America where Maloney27 and others have argued that workers choose to 
move into the informal sector to escape onerous legislative requirements, there are 
two arguments that appear to counter this free-choice view. On the one hand the 
movements occur in both directions, not just formal to informal which one would 
expect if the free-choice view dominates. On the other hand, as the gross incomes 
above suggest, there seems to be very little, if any, economic benefit associated with 
movements from formal to informal employment.  
                                               
26 The income bands are as follows: 1= None, 2 = R1-R200, 3 = R201-500, 4=R501-1000, 5=R1001-
1500, 6=R1501-2500, 7=R 2501-3500, 8=R3501-4500, 9=R4501-6000, 10=R6001-8000, 11=R8001-
11000, 12=R11001-16000, R13=16001-30000, R14=30000+. 
27 Maloney (2004). 





3.3 Intra-household linkages between the formal and informal worker 
Another possible linkage between work in the formal and the informal sector can 
occur within the household. Using the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey 
(KIDS),28 Lebani and Valodia29 explore employment transitions in households 
between 1993 and 1998. They find evidence of an intra-household link between 
self-employment activities and formal economy workers. This association suggests 
that there is a transfer of human and financial capital by the formally employed to 
self-employment activities, since it is the households that have some form of regular 
income that are mostly involved in self-employment initiatives. In short, households 
with access to a formal job are more likely to have access to resources for another 
member of the household to earn an income in the informal sector. Similarly, 
Webster states that “the modern sector depends on the informal and the majority of 
households combine work in the two sectors”30.  
Our analysis of the March 2004 LFS shows that, in South Africa, 5 891 135 
households have at least one formal worker and 1 639 783 households have at least 
one informal worker.31 However, relatively few households – 326 275 or 2.5% of 
households – accommodate at least one formal and one informal worker. Of all 
households, just over a quarter million (254 672) are composed of one formal and 
one informal worker. Households with both a formal and informal worker represent 
an interesting focus, since these are effectively a centre for the continuum between 
households with exclusively formal and informal workers.  
What is the nature of these households? Has the household structure come about 
by choice or because of growing informalisation of the labour market?  What are the 
income and poverty characteristics of these households? 
Ninety-four percent of single formal-single informal worker households do not 
accommodate another type of worker (that is, an agricultural or domestic worker). 
Thirty-eight percent of these households have no other member of working age. 
However, 38.6% accommodate at least one economically inactive person, 10.2% 
accommodate both economically inactive and unemployed members, and 7.5% 
accommodate at least one unemployed member. The high proportion of households 
with dependants supports Webster’s claim, citing work by Mosoetsa, that many 
households attract members in need of support. 32  
Table 9 below shows that single formal-single informal households are more 
likely to be located in urban areas, have a larger household size than the average 
South African household and, proportionately, coloured and white households are 
over-represented among these households.  
                                               
28 See www.ukzn.ac.za/csds for details of the KIDS data. 
29 Lebani and Valodia “The dynamics of employment and poverty in South Africa” (2005). 
30 Webster “The dual economy” (2004). 
31 At the worker level the ratio of formal to informal workers is 1: 0.23  (7 827 251: 1 833 612); the 
ratio at household level is marginally less, i.e. 1: 0.27. 
32 Webster (2004). 





Table 9: Single formal-single informal households  
 All households (%) Single formal-single informal 
households (%) 
Urban 60.5 69.3 
Black 77.8 69.3 
Coloured 7.9 11.5 
Indian 2.5 1.8 
White 11.8 17.3 
N in household (mean) 3.6 4.7 
(Source: authors calculations from LFS)  
Shifting to the worker level, some interesting associations between the formal and 
informal workers in the same household become evident. Table 10 shows that there 
appears to be a strong association between category of occupation of formal and 
informal workers.   
Table 10: Occupation of formal worker by occupation of informal worker  






















Manager 7.2 6.8 11.6 15.4 0.6 10.0 0.0 2.5 6.3 
Profess-
ional 
30.7 31.9 2.2 1.5 0.5 0.0 2.5 0.0 4.0 
Techni-
cian 
39.1 32.9 14.7 9.1 10.3 5.5 8.0 5.7 11.3 
Clerk 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.2 0.0 2.9 11.4 3.7 
Service 
worker 
4.4 12.3 13.1 13.2 22.0 19.1 19.9 11.7 15.1 
Craft 
worker 
8.9 4.4 24.0 33.0 22.8 16.5 26.4 18.8 21.1 





9.8 11.7 31.4 24.5 30.1 42.5 33.2 43.9 32.9 
N 9 776 16 453 34 771 34 
231 
40 704 30 377 21 592 66 446 254 
350 
 




For example, when the formal worker is a manager (n=9,776), 30% of the 
cohabiting informal workers were professionals and 39% were in technical 
occupations. Fewer than 10% of the informal workers paired with a formal manager 
reported an elementary occupation. Similar trends are observed for professional 
formal workers. As the category of occupation becomes less skilled the proportion 
of elementary informal workers paired with a formal worker increases. For 
example, 31.4% of formal technicians are paired with an elementary informal 
worker. And at the lowest end of the scale, when the formal worker reported an 
elementary occupation (n=66,446), 44% of cohabiting informal workers were in 
elementary occupations, 14% craft workers, 11% service, 11% clerks, less than 6% 
technical, and only 2.5% were managers. There is a distinct distribution by gender 
for formal and informal workers (see Table 11). When the formal worker is male, 
77.8% of the cohabiting informal workers are female. Similarly, when the formal 
worker is female, 81.9% of informal workers are male.  
Table 11: Gender of formal worker by gender of informal worker 
 Gender of formal worker 
Gender of informal worker Male Female 
Male 22.2 81.9 
Female 77.8 18.8 
N 143 327 111 345 
 
Table 12 shows that the cohabiting male and female workers are likely to be in a 
marital partnership. When the formal worker is married or living together, 90.3% of 
the informal workers report being married or living together. A significantly lower 
percentage of formal workers who have never married cohabit with an informal 
worker who is married (31.5%).  
Table 12: Marital status of formal and informal worker 
 Marital status of  formal worker 










90.3 25.4 19.4 31.5 
Widowed 1.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 
Divorced/ separated 0.0 0.0 25.7 4.9 
Never married 8.7 74.6 55.0 56.8 
N 175 061 4 477 4 557 70 577 
Where the female formal worker is paired with an informal female worker it 
would be interesting to know whether the relationship is that of mother and 




daughter. Unfortunately the LFS does not allow us to establish the relationship 
between individuals (other than partnerships). However, it is possible to infer a 
relationship by looking at age. Table 13 shows that the average age of cohabiting 
formal and informal workers is 41.6 and 41.5 years respectively. The average age of 
cohabiting formal and informal female workers is 34.5 and 43.5 years respectively. 
If this age difference indeed reflects a mother-daughter relationship, the older 
woman is apparently the informal worker. However, the relationship can work in 
both directions, as demonstrated in Table 13. This table shows that high 
proportions of older formal women cohabit with young informal women and high 
proportions of younger formal women cohabit with older informal women 
(although on average informal women workers are older).  
Table 13: Age of formal and informal worker in households with two female 
workers 
 Age of female formal worker 
Age of female  
informal worker 
20-29 yrs 30-39 yrs 40-49 yrs 50-59 yrs 
15-19 yrs 0.0 0.0 24.5 0.0 
20-29 yrs 0.0 7.4 48.3 50.1 
30-39 yrs 4.7 4.1 0.0 35.7 
40-49 yrs 50.2 45.1 14.9 14.2 
50-59 yrs 13.6 28.7 0.0 0.0 
60-69 yrs 28.3 14.6 12.4 0.0 
70+ yrs 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N 9 002 4 074 3 654 3 453 
 
Table 14 (see page 17 below) shows that there is a significant positive 
association between education levels of cohabiting formal and informal workers.  Of 
formal workers with no education, 50.3% cohabit with an informal worker with no 
education and 44.4% with an informal worker with primary education only. In 
contrast, of formal workers with post-matric, 41.0% cohabit with an informal 
worker with post-matric and 26.3% with an informal worker with matric.  
Further, there is a significant positive association between income of formal and 
informal worker cohabiting. In the case of formal workers earning R1-200, 81.6% of 
the informal workers cohabiting earn R1 000 or less. In contrast, of formal workers 
earning R11 001-30 000+, just 6.2% of informal workers cohabiting earn R1 000 or 
less. However, as is evident from  
Table 15 (see page 17 below), some informal workers earn more than their 
formal counterparts. For example, when a formal worker reports earning R1-200, 
almost 70% of their informal partners earn over R200. 





Table 14: Education levels in households, formal: informal workers 




No education Primary Secondary Matric Post-matric 
No 
education 
50.3 14.3 3.9 5.7 2.7 
Primary 44.4 44.5 23.8 14.0 6.6 
Secondary 0.0 29.7 52.2 40.1 23.3 
Matric 0.0 10.4 18.6 32.4 26.3 
Post-matric 5.3 1.2 1.4 7.9 41.0 
N 5,078 45,187 71,641 68,974 60,841 
 
Table 15: Incomes, formal: informal workers 



















- 30 000 
None 0.0 0.0 4.3 1.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
R1-200 31.2 31.6 9.7 12.6 8.8 14.4 3.7 0.6 
R201-500 36.2 39.0 32.7 17.0 27.2 21.6 9.7 2.8 
R501-       
1 000 
14.2 23.5 21.2 26.4 25.3 24.3 9.0 2.8 
R1 001-      
1 500 
0.0 2.1 16.8 14.1 14.4 7.6 9.3 0.0 
R1 501-      
2 500 
18.4 3.9 2.3 23.2 13.8 13.9 10.6 14.4 
R2 501-      
4 500 
0.0 0.0 8.2 4.6 3.4 10.5 12.5 19.0 
R4 501-   
11 000 
0.0 0.0 4.9 0.7 3.9 5.4 20.4 51.2 
R11 001-  
30 000 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.3 24.8 9.1 
N 3,283 16,293 45,621 34,421 37,892 36,022 42,075 9,750 
 
3.3  “Informal” formal labour and labour brokering  




A final set of trends, representing a less explicit linkage between formal and 
informal, is the growing informalisation of the formal and increasing use of labour 
brokering within the South African economy. Devey et al33 show that many workers 
classified as formal workers have employment characteristics that are consistent 
with informal work. There is also significant evidence from micro-level studies 
which highlights the growing informalisation of previously formal work. Kenny34 in 
her analysis of the retail sector not only demonstrates that casual and subcontracted 
labour constitutes up to 65% of total employment, but highlights how core tasks like 
shelf-packing are increasingly done by employees of labour brokers, contracted by 
suppliers. Skinner and Valodia’s analysis of COFESA35 revealed that COFESA firms 
no longer had to adhere to collective agreements on minimum wages or contribute 
to any of the benefit or training schemes.  In the workplace, other than changes in 
labour conditions, everything else remained the same. Skinner and Valodia 
demonstrated how by the end of 2000 COFESA estimated that this had resulted in 
the creation of over 700 000 independent contractors. Similarly, almost all 
interviewees in Theron and Godfrey’s36 study of stakeholders from numerous 
industries – retail, mining, manufacturing (food, clothing, metal and engineering) 
catering and accommodation, construction and transport – reported an increase in 
the use of labour brokers and employment agencies. 
The legislative loophole in the Labour Relations Act (LRA) that COFESA was 
using was subsequently closed.37 It is unclear whether the processes COFESA set in 
place have been reversed.   
 
4 DISCUSSION 
The articulation of the “first” and “second” economy conceptualisation of South 
Africa by the Presidency coincided, we would argue, with a refocusing of economic 
policy in South Africa.  This conceptualisation tacitly acknowledges the failure of the 
trickle-down economic growth policies so central to the post-1996 “GEAR”38 era 
                                               
33 Devey et al “Definitions, data and the informal economy in South Africa” (2006). 
34 Kenny “Militant divisions, collective possibilities” (2005). 
35 Skinner and Valodia “Labour market policy, flexibility and the future of labour relations” (2002). 
COFESA (the Confederation of Employers South Africa) is a labour consultancy that assists 
companies to restructure their workforces, to change employees to independent contractors and 
outsource production to them. COFESA members are involved in many different sectors, notably 
footwear and clothing manufacturing and also food, farming, transport, construction and 
engineering. 
36 Theron and Godfrey “Protecting workers on the periphery” (2000). 
37 The labour courts have, in a growing number of cases, ruled that the objective status of an 
employee cannot be changed by contractual formalities, that an employer and employee cannot 
“contract out” of the protection provided by the LRA and that the court should have regard to the 
true nature of an employment relationship rather than the terms used to describe it: see, in 
particular, Building Bargaining Council (Southern & Eastern Cape) v Melmons Cabinets CC & another 
[2001] 3 BLLR 329 (LC) and Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber [2005] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC): - Editor. 
38 The reference is to the government’s “Growth Employment and Redistribution” policy, introduced 
in 1996: for concise comment see, e.g., Goldberg M “Small enterprises, the Labour Relations Act and 




which inform much of government’s more recent emphasis on poverty alleviation. 
However, the dualism suggested by arguments about a “structural” break between 
the first and second economy allows government to argue that its economic policies 
have been successful for the first economy and, as a result of these successes, 
government is now able to address issues of poverty and unemployment in the 
second economy. Yet, for all its claimed successes in stabilising South Africa’s 
macroeconomic situation after 1994, promoting black economic empowerment and 
re-orienting the budget to meet some social objectives, it is accepted even in 
government that its major failing has been its inability to address South Africa’s 
unemployment situation and, related to this, the high levels of poverty among 
segments of the population.  
At the policy level a clear understanding of the linkages between the formal and 
the informal economy is critical for the development of good policy. At one level, 
government’s recent preoccupation with the “second economy” has undoubtedly 
raised the profile of the unemployed and those operating in the informal economy. 
This is a positive development. However, the concept is not useful for understanding 
the history and current challenges facing the economy. We have provided evidence 
that the so-called “first” and second economies are in fact linked. Further, large 
numbers of workers in South Africa are employed in low-waged work. While the 
extent of low-waged work is very high in jobs presently classified as informal, large 
sections of the formal economy are also characterised by low-waged employment. 
Our analysis of the LFS panel data suggests that there is a surprisingly high level of 
churning in the labour market, with high levels of movement between formal and 
informal jobs. The data suggests that these movements occur primarily in the low-
waged segment of the labour market, and incomes do appear to rise or fall as 
workers move between formal and informal jobs. At the household level we find a 
bifurcated relationship – households with access to high-income employment in the 
formal economy seem more able to earn high incomes in the informal economy, and 
vice versa. What then might be the implications of our findings for research on 
poverty and the development of policy?  
 
4.1 Focus on segmented labour markets for employment generation 
strategies 
Research by Budlender et al39, Naidoo et al40 and Skinner41, described above, 
suggests informal workers are more active in selected industrial sectors – notably 
trade, construction, community services and finance sectors. This distribution is 
likely primarily because the informal worker has relatively easy access to an 
unregulated market in these sectors. This sectoral concentration could be used to 
                                                                                                                                            
collective bargaining in South Africa” (1997) 1 LDD 83 at 86-87; Gostner K and Joffe A “Negotiating 
the  future: Labour's  role in NEDLAC” (1998) 2 LDD 131 at 141 - Editor.  
39 Budlender et al (2001). 
40 Naidoo, van Aart and Ligthelm, (2004). 
41 Skinner (2005). 




identify opportunities and constraints for employment creation. The findings call to 
mind Ben Fine’s42 position on segmented labour markets:  
“Hopefully, even this cursory examination of the more general literature on South 
African labour markets, as well as of the shifting reproduction of the mining labour 
market, suffices to demonstrate that labour market structures are the product of 
underlying socio-economic factors, and that the labour markets are structured 
differently from one another whilst sharing some determinants in common. The specific 
features of the South African mining labour market is blatant evidence of such a 
conclusion; it is a market that is entirely different from that of domestic servants or 
agricultural workers, whatever wages and conditions are attached to them all.” 
Fine goes on to caution:    
“Considerable analytical care needs to be taken in identifying and explaining labour 
market structures, especially in distinguishing them from differentiation as equality in 
outcomes. … that each labour market segment is structured differently. The means vary 
by which each is created, reproduced and has effects”. 
Altman and Mayer43 have identified construction, social services and food sectors as 
having significant potential for employment growth in South Africa. These authors 
propose that “distinct industrial strategies that redress demand and supply 
constraints and ensure that policy imperatives such as black economic 
empowerment are realised” and “sustained and credible expenditure” are necessary 
to achieve employment growth. Like Fine, they suggest a detailed analysis of the 
industries in question before specific policy is developed and implemented. And 
although there is apparently less interaction between informal workers and the 
global markets (in the context of exports) relative to the formal economy, a sectoral 
strategy would require careful consideration of global relationships. As Rodgers 
observes:  
“Yet numerous pitfalls await any attempt at formulating appropriate policy toward 
structural fluctuations in today’s global economy”.44  
 
4.2 Use the decent work agenda as a lens to identify and stabilise 
insecure employment 
The existence of churning within and between the formal and informal economies 
suggest that there may be some security of employment over a short period but that 
over a longer period informal work is unstable and precarious. This finding is borne 
out by research of Ligthelm45 who argues that just 10-15% of informal 
entrepreneurs have the skills to expand their business. This, along with evidence of 
increased labour brokering, demonstrates high levels of insecure employment.  
                                               
42 Fine (1998). 
43 Altman and Meyer “Sectoral strategies for employment creation” (2003) at 21. 
44 Phelps et al Structural Slump (1994). 
45 Ligthelm “A targeted approach to informal business development” (2008). 




The newer work-based definition of informal work resonates with the decent 
work framework developed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).46 The 
decent work agenda stems from concerns that the labour market will increasingly 
be populated by low productivity survivalist jobs, forced labour, or employment 
guarantees without productive outcome.47 The decent work agenda includes access 
to productive employment for all, security of work and income and respect for core 
rights at work.48 This agenda would marry well with policy focused on addressing 
insecure employment. 
There is evidence that the decent work agenda has gained a strong foothold in 
South African political rhetoric. Thus, President Jacob Zuma is reported that have 
stated that “[t]he creation and retention of decent jobs will be the primary focus of 
all economic policies of the ANC government”.49 Decent work also features in the 
Presidency’s second economy framework, which states that “[n]ew work, decent 
work is likely to come mainly from growth in the more developed, formal, core 
economy: including the more formal end of the SME”.50 Decent work is also a central 
pillar of COSATU’s policy agenda.  
In the second economy strategy, one of the interventions proposed for the most 
marginalised is to massively expand public employment, including a form of 
minimum employment guarantee.51 This is laudable as a temporary solution. 
However, Booth52 has criticised earlier formulations of public works programmes 
because of poor job standards; and there is a question as to whether newer 
manifestations either qualify as decent work or are leading to sustained (secure) 
employment for participants. The use of the decent work framework, although not 
prescriptive, provides a useful benchmark through which to identify and monitor 
access to jobs, security and quality of work, and rights of the worker.  
 
4.3.   Use class-based analysis to understand socio-economic reasons 
underlying structural poverty  
Analysis of households containing formal and informal workers revealed a strong 
association between education level and income of workers. This suggests there is a 
class-based structure underlying the distribution of formal and informal workers 
within households. During a discussion session at the Working on the Margins 
workshop hosted by PLAAS in Cape Town in March 2009, Ben Cousins raised the 
important but neglected role of class analysis in the evaluation of structural causes 
of poverty.  
                                               
46 See ILO “Decent Work Agenda” at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/ 
lang--en/index.htm (accessed 9 July 2011) – Editor. 
47 Rodgers “The goal of decent work” (2008). 
48 Rodgers “Labour market flexibility and decent work” (2008). 
49 Speech at ANC conference in Gauteng, November 2008: Sunday Times 30 November 2008. 
50 Philip (2009). 
51 Philip (2009). 
52 Booth (1998). 




Wright53 has developed a framework for measuring class structure and 
permeability. The class grid is based on dimensions of property, authority and skill. 
This framework could be extended to formal and informal work and would provide 
a useful tool to analyse linkages (permeability) between economies. Unfortunately, 
we cannot use the framework for the LFS datasets cited above because, while we 
have indicators measuring relation to means of production (owner, employee), and 
relation to scarce skills (experts, skilled, non-skilled), we do not have a clear 
measure of relation to authority (manager, supervisor, non-manager). We need a 
more nuanced measurement of work – in this case the inclusion of an indicator to 
measure relation to authority – to be able to test different, but potentially critical, 
paths of analysis.   
 
5 CONCLUSION 
According to Booth,54 state policy in the 1980s was developed to create employment 
in the informal economy – through removing legislation and providing capital to 
entrepreneurs – as a temporary measure to alleviate unemployment. The growth of 
the informal economy and high unemployment rates imply that older and more 
recent policy has failed.  
Poverty alleviation policies which are premised on viewing the economy as two 
distinct and unconnected parts of the economy are misguided. There is an urgent 
need to move away from viewing the formal and informal economy as dichotomies. 
This is not to suggest that the term is not useful. Rather, “formal” and “informal” 
need to be seen as part of a continuum, or as interacting sets, each with high levels 
of heterogeneity in the nature of economic activity. 
Our analysis suggests that at the lower end of the labour market in South Africa 
there is a large amount of movement between formal and informal employment. 
The International Conference of Labour Statistics has proposed a new concept of the 
informal economy which takes the nature of the employment (and not the nature of 
the enterprise as is currently the case) to distinguish between formal and informal 
employment55. Our data, and the high levels of churning at the lower end of the 
labour market, suggest that the concept of the informal economy remains very 
useful for studies of poverty.  
Longitudinal panel data may give us a lot of new insight into the nature of work 
and on the work-related activities of vulnerable workers. The panel data that we 
have used is a pilot project for Statistics South Africa. We suggest that the LFS panel 
be made available to researchers and that adequate documentation be released so 
that researchers are able to interrogate and use the data.  
 Finally, our analysis suggests that, contrary to the views of Maloney and his 
collaborators, informal employment in the South African case at least is not a first 
                                               
53 Wright Class Counts (1997). 
54 Booth (1998). 
55 See Chen et al Women, work and poverty (2005). 




choice for workers. While there are certainly some aspects of the informal economy 
which might be lucrative, and there may be some actors evading government 
regulation, the movements that we explore do not suggest that workers voluntarily 
move into the informal economy for higher incomes.  
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